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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case proves once again that people will fight for a 
catchy name.  Thomas Sköld sued his former business 
partner, Galderma Laboratories L.P. (“Galderma”), alleging 
that its use of the trademark “Restoraderm” constitutes 
trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, 
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.  In the District 
Court, only Sköld’s unjust enrichment claim was successful.  
He now appeals the Court’s refusal to direct a verdict in his 
favor on infringement and its denial of his post-trial motions.  
Galderma cross-appeals,1 arguing that Sköld does not own the 
                                                 
 1  The District Court granted judgment on Sköld’s 
unjust enrichment claim against Defendants Galderma L.P., 
Galderma S.A., and Nestle Skin Health S.A, but not against 
Galderma Laboratories, Inc. because “the 2004 Agreement 
precluded that claim against [Galderma Laboratories,] Inc. as 
CollaGenex’s successor-in-interest.”  Accordingly, Galderma 
Laboratories, Inc. did not cross-appeal. 
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Restoraderm mark and that the unjust enrichment verdict 
cannot stand.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in 
part and reverse in part the judgment entered by the District 




A. Factual History2 
 
Sköld is an inventor and entrepreneur.  He coined the 
name “Restoraderm” for a proprietary drug-delivery 
formulation that he developed for potential use in skin-care 
products.  In the early 2000s, he began searching for a partner 
to help produce and sell Restoraderm products.  To that end, 
he attended a dermatology conference in 2002, where he 
presented a publication on Restoraderm and distributed 
samples of a potential product.   
 
Even before that, Sköld had attracted the interest of 
CollaGenex, a skin-care company that was later acquired by 
Galderma.  CollaGenex and Sköld began negotiations to 
                                                 
2  While a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of 
law is given plenary review, we generally assume the jury 
properly found facts.  Mancini v. Northampton Cty., 836 F.3d 
308, 314 (3d Cir. 2016).  The facts recounted here are 
consistent with Sköld’s perspective, despite our ultimate 
disagreement with the legal conclusion he seeks.  Cf. id. 
(“Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
we must examine the record in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, giving [the plaintiff] the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences, even though contrary inferences might reasonably 
be drawn.”) 
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establish a co-development partnership, and, after several 
months, they executed a letter of intent.  The letter, signed in 
2001, stated that “[a]ll trade marks associated with the drug 
delivery system; the proposed intellectual property; products 
deriving therefrom and products marketed or to be marketed 
by CollaGenex and/or any commercial partner of CollaGenex 
anywhere in the world shall be applied for and registered in 
the name of CollaGenex and be the exclusive property of 
CollaGenex.”  (App. at 1456 (emphasis added).)   
 
Then, in 2002, Sköld and CollaGenex signed a 
contract they titled the “Co-Operation, Development and 
Licensing Agreement” (the “2002 Agreement”).  Under its 
terms, “[a]ll trade marks applied for or registered (including 
‘Restoraderm’) shall be in the sole name of CollaGenex and 
be the exclusive property of CollaGenex during the Term and 
thereafter[.]”  (App. at 1465 (emphasis added).)  A survival 
provision stipulated that vested rights would outlive the term 
of the agreement.  In particular, that provision said, “[a]ny 
termination under this Agreement … shall not affect in any 
manner vested rights of either party arising out of this 
Agreement prior to termination.”  (App. at 1469.) 
 
After the 2002 Agreement was executed, CollaGenex 
issued a press release announcing its plans to develop a 
Restoraderm product line.  It proudly publicized that “it ha[d] 
licensed a novel … technology … named 
Restoraderm(TM)… [that would] form the basis for a novel, 
proprietary and differentiated portfolio of topical 
dermatological pharmaceuticals.”  (D.I. 78-5 at 676).  With 
Sköld’s cooperation, CollaGenex promptly applied to register 
the Restoraderm mark with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (the “PTO”).     




Two years later, Sköld and CollaGenex replaced their 
2002 Agreement with an Asset Purchase and Product 
Development Agreement (the “2004 Agreement”).  Under the 
2004 Agreement, Sköld transferred “Restoraderm Intellectual 
Property” and related goodwill to CollaGenex.  (App. at 
1479.)  “Restoraderm Intellectual Property” was defined to 
include patent rights and associated know-how.  (App. at 
1478.)  While separate provisions addressing trademark rights 
were initially contained in a draft of the 2004 Agreement, 
those provisions were removed prior to finalization of the 
document.  Sköld later admitted at his deposition that their 
removal was “probably” because CollaGenex already owned 
the Restoraderm trademark.3  (D.I. 76-23 at 351-352.)   
                                                 
 3  Q.  Now, you’ll see here that in Mr. Glazer’s email 
to you, as we talked about this morning, he cites, 
“Also, Collagenex has informed me that it already 
owns the Restoraderm trademark.  Accordingly, are 
there any other trademarks that you own that should be 
assigned to Collagenex relating to this technology? If 
there's not, we can delete these trademark provisions 
from the agreement.”  Now, in fact, that’s what 
happened; isn’t that correct, sir? The trademark 
provisions that we just looked at in Exhibit F in 
Section 1.20 and 1.24 were removed, were deleted or 
removed from the draft; isn’t that correct? 
A.  I don’t know when, but it’s apparent that it is not in 
the signed version, and I imagine that that is due to 
that I didn’t have any other names that they were 
interested in to be part of the asset.  
Q.  Okay. 
A.  So your conclusion is probably right. 




In 2008, Galderma bought CollaGenex.  Afterwards, it 
conducted two analyses of its newly acquired intellectual 
property portfolio.  Both analyses proposed using 
Restoraderm as a brand name, given its strength and implicit 
associations with skin restoration, but the suggestion was to 
use the name on products employing other technologies, not 
Sköld’s.4     
 
By early 2009, Galderma decided in fact to use the 
Restoraderm mark on products that did not use Sköld’s 
technology.  While Galderma informed its employees of that 
plan, it did not inform Sköld.  He later heard a rumor that 
Galderma was abandoning his technology, so, in June 2009, 
he confronted an executive but was told he “shouldn’t take 
any notice of [the rumor].”  (App. at 242:13-14.)  Actually, he 
should have, because, in November 2009, Galderma 
terminated the 2004 Agreement.5     
                                                                                                             
 
(D.I. 76-23 at 351-352.)   
 
4  The analyses were conducted in 2008 and 2009.  The 
2008 analysis noted that the “[a]greement with the inventor 
[Sköld] could be stopped at any time.”  (App. at 1791.)  The 
2009 analysis noted that the Restoraderm mark “fits well with 
the concept of barrier repair/restoration[,]” and that the name 
“implies barrier repair/restoring and is appreciated by the 
HCP [(“Health Care Professional”)] community.”  (App. at 
1649.)   
 
5  After the partnership ended, Sköld petitioned the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office to cancel 
CollaGenex’s (then Galderma’s) registration of the 




After that, Sköld sent Galderma a list of assets for it to 
return, including the Restoraderm trademark.  Galderma did 
not surrender the mark and instead responded that “we are 
[the] owner of this trade name” and that Sköld should not 
“use this name anymore in your communication on the 
technology.”  (App. at 1670.)  Sköld conceded in reply that 
Galderma was “for now, the rightful owner until your 
position is challenged.”  (App. at 1669.)   
 
Sköld sought and eventually found new co-
development partners for his skin-care technology.6  The 
resulting products, both nascent and on the market, are based 
on the original Restoraderm technology but do not bear the 
Restoraderm mark.7  In the meantime, Galderma’s 
Restoraderm product line has enjoyed international success.   
B. Procedural History  
 
In September 2014, Sköld filed this suit against 
Galderma.  He alleged trademark infringement, unfair 
                                                                                                             
 
Restoraderm mark.  The contest over that petition remains 
pending.   
 
6  Finding new partners was difficult for Sköld because 
of Galderma’s success and the resulting brand recognition of 
Restoraderm.  “Various companies did not feel comfortable 
discussing business with Sköld about RESTORADERM and 
RESTORADERM technology, given Galderma’s use of the 
trademark.”  (App. at 1756.)   
 
7  Sköld tried to register a similar trademark for his 
products – Restoraderm Lipogrid – but Galderma opposed it.     
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competition, and false advertising under the Lanham Act, and 
breach of contract, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment 
under Pennsylvania law.     
 
Galderma moved for summary judgment, alleging that 
Sköld did not own the Restoraderm mark.  Sköld v. Galderma 
Labs., L.P., No. 14-5280, 2016 WL 724755, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 24, 2016).  The District Court disagreed and concluded 
that, despite the language in the 2002 Agreement with respect 
to trademark ownership, the 2004 Agreement voided any 
ownership rights that Galderma had in the mark.  Id.  The 
Court also considered a provision in the 2004 Agreement 
stating, “Sk[ö]ld shall sell, transfer and deliver to CollaGenex 
… all goodwill, if any, relating to the [Restoraderm 
Intellectual Property].”  (App. at 1479;)  Sköld, 2016 WL 
724755, at *5.  Whether that provision encompassed, and thus 
again transferred, the Restoraderm mark to CollaGenex was 
something the District Court decided should await further 
fact-finding.  Id. at *5-6.   The Court therefore denied 
summary judgment.  Id. at *6. 
 
The case went to trial and, assuming he would win on 
the question of ownership of the mark, Sköld asked the 
District Court to direct the jury to find a likelihood of 
confusion due to Galderma’s use of an identical mark on 
similar skin-care products.  The Court denied that request.     
 
The jury decided that Sköld was the rightful owner of 
the mark and that he had proven unjust enrichment.  
Nonetheless, the jury also concluded that Sköld had failed to 
establish his claims for infringement, unfair competition, false 
advertising, and breach of contract.  According to the special 
interrogatories returned with the verdict, the jury concluded, 
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on the infringement and unfair competition claims, that Sköld 
had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, despite 
the identical word mark being used on skin-care products 
similar to ones Sköld had developed.  The jury likewise 
concluded that, with respect to the false advertising claim, 
Galderma’s use of the Restoraderm mark had no capacity to 
deceive.     
 
Both Sköld and Galderma filed post-trial motions.  
Sköld moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on 
his claims, except for his successful unjust enrichment claim, 
as to which he sought a new trial on damages and declaratory 
relief confirming the jury’s finding in his favor.  Regarding 
the trademark infringement and false advertising claims, he 
argued that the District Court had erred in denying his motion 
to direct a judgment on likelihood of confusion.  Moreover, 
he argued, declaratory and injunctive relief was warranted 
and should have been granted.  Galderma argued in its post-
trial motion that Sköld’s unjust enrichment claim should be 
rejected on both substantive and procedural grounds.  The 
Court granted Sköld’s request for a declaration as to unjust 
enrichment, but otherwise denied the motions.   
 
In this appeal, Sköld argues that the District Court 
erred by failing to direct the jury on likelihood of confusion, 
as he had asked, and by denying his post-trial motions with 
respect to infringement, false advertising, and the remedy for 
his unjust enrichment claim.  Galderma has cross-appealed 
and argues that Sköld does not own the Restoraderm mark.  It 
also seeks dismissal of the unjust enrichment judgment.   
 





Ownership of the Restoraderm mark is the dispositive 
issue in this case, and, on this record, it is a matter of contract 
interpretation subject to plenary review.9  At the end of the 
day, we conclude that Galderma is the rightful owner.  The 
2002 Agreement unambiguously provided for transfer of the 
mark to Galderma’s predecessor in interest, CollaGenex.  
Upon registration of the mark, that ownership became vested 
and was confirmed for all the world to see.  Even assuming 
that the 2004 Agreement completely superseded the 2002 
Agreement, it did nothing to disturb those vested rights.  The 
ownership issue should not have gone to the jury.    
 
A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible to 
two reasonable interpretations.  Duquesne Light Co. v. 
                                                 
8  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1338(a) and (b).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
9  “We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusions ….”  Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check 
Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2001).   
The determination of “[w]hether a contract is ambiguous is an 
issue of law subject to plenary review.”  Mylan Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2013).  
And we review the interpretation of an unambiguous contract 
de novo.  See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Gov’t of Virgin 
Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is a 
fundamental principle of contract law that ‘disputes involving 
the interpretation of unambiguous contracts are resolvable as 
a matter of law[.]’” (citation omitted)). 
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Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Ambiguity arises when language “is obscure in meaning 
through indefiniteness of expression or has a double 
meaning.”  Id.  “A contract is not ambiguous if the court can 
determine its meaning without any guide other than a 
knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of 
the language in general, its meaning depends ….”  Id. 
(quoting Samuel Rappaport Family P’ship v. Meridian Bank, 
657 A.2d 17, 21–22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)).10    
 
From the outset, the dealings between Sköld and 
Galderma’s predecessor in interest, CollaGenex, 
demonstrated a clear intent that CollaGenex would own the 
trademark at issue.  As the 2001 letter of intent put it: “[a]ll 
trade marks associated with [Restoraderm intellectual 
property and products] … shall be applied for and registered 
in the name of CollaGenex and be the exclusive property of 
CollaGenex.”  (App. at 1456.)  That intent was confirmed 
again in the 2002 Agreement, which said that, upon 
application with the PTO for registration of the Restoraderm 
mark, CollaGenex would be the sole owner of the mark.  The 
language of the agreement is straightforward: “[a]ll trade 
marks applied for or registered (including ‘Restoraderm’) 
shall be in the sole name of CollaGenex and be the exclusive 
property of CollaGenex during the Term [of the agreement] 
and thereafter[.]”  (App. at 1465.)   
 
Beyond broadly affirming that any trademarks applied 
for during the term were the sole property of CollaGenex, the 
2002 Agreement explicitly identified the Restoraderm mark.  
                                                 
10  It is undisputed that both the 2002 and 2004 
Agreements are governed by Pennsylvania law.   
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Accordingly, by the terms of the agreement, when 
CollaGenex applied to register “Restoraderm,” the mark 
became CollaGenex’s sole property.  And, when the 2002 
Agreement said the Restoraderm mark would “be the 
exclusive property of CollaGenex during the Term [of the 
agreement] and thereafter[,]” it demonstrated clearly the 
parties’ intent that the mark was to remain CollaGenex’s 
property, regardless of any termination of the agreement.  
(App. at 1465.)    
 
That conclusion is confirmed by another provision in 
the 2002 Agreement.  Because it created rights that would 
outlive its term,11 the agreement included a provision 
addressing those rights, titled “Term and Termination and 
Reversion of Rights.”  (App. at 1468.)  That provision stated 
that “[a]ny termination [of the 2002 Agreement] … shall not 
affect in any manner vested rights of either party arising out 
of this Agreement prior to termination.”  (App. at 1469 
(emphasis added).)  In other words, the 2002 Agreement 
unambiguously stipulated that, in the event of any 
termination, vested rights would survive.  CollaGenex’s right 
to Restoraderm vested upon its application for registration of 
that mark, and when the parties voluntarily terminated the 
2002 Agreement that right remained unaffected.  The survival 
provision reinforces that the transfer provision is not 
susceptible to another reasonable interpretation.  Thus, the 
2002 Agreement plainly and permanently transferred to 
                                                 
 11  “Term,” as used in the trademark transfer provision 
of the 2002 Agreement, was defined as “the term of this 
Agreement and any extension thereto as defined herein.”  
(App. at 1458.)  The term of the Agreement was tied to the 
life of patent rights Sköld had acquired.   
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CollaGenex all ownership rights in the Restoraderm mark, 
once application to register the mark was made.  
 
The 2004 Agreement did not change that.  The subject 
matter of the 2004 Agreement was limited to “Restoraderm 
Intellectual Property.”  On its face, that might appear to 
include trademarks, but the term “Restoraderm Intellectual 
Property” is precisely defined and limited to patent rights, 
know-how, and the right to enforce those proprietary rights.  
To his credit, Sköld acknowledges that, in the 2004 
Agreement, “[t]he definition of ‘Restoraderm Intellectual 
Property’ did not include trademarks.”  (Sköld Opening Br. at 
10.)   That concession is sensible since the 2004 Agreement 
does not identify or address the Restoraderm mark in 
particular, nor does it address trademarks generally.  While 
the 2004 Agreement may have been designed to replace and 
terminate the 2002 Agreement, it cannot fairly be interpreted 
as recovering ownership of the Restoraderm trademark for 
Sköld.  Not a word is said about such a significant step.  The 
mostly boilerplate integration clause in the 2004 Agreement 
did not silently unwind the vested trademark rights, especially 
given the parties’ very plain statement in the 2002 Agreement 
that, in the event of a termination of that earlier agreement, 
the ownership rights in the Restoraderm mark would remain 
vested.   See Int’l Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 110 A.2d 
186, 191 (Pa. 1955) (“The presence of an integration clause 
cannot invest a writing with any greater sanctity than the 
writing merits[.]”).   
 
To the extent the integration clause in the 2004 
Agreement strayed from boilerplate language, it supports 
Galderma’s ownership of the mark, by succession to 
CollaGenex’s rights.  The clause states that it “cancels and 
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supersedes any and all prior negotiations, correspondence, 
understandings and agreements (including the [2002 
Agreement]) whether oral or written, between the Parties 
respecting the subject matter hereof and thereof; provided that 
nothing in this Agreement shall replace, supercede [sic], 
cancel or modify any prior agreements or assignments 
between the Parties that have been filed with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office.”  (App. at 1495.)  The 
clause thus carved out certain rights arising from the 2002 
Agreement that would not be superseded or otherwise undone 
by the 2004 Agreement, namely, agreements and assignments 
registered with the PTO.  Although the 2002 Agreement itself 
was not filed with the PTO, Sköld does not argue that 
CollaGenex’s ownership, documented at the PTO, is excluded 
from the 2004 Agreement’s intention to not disturb or 
otherwise affect rights memorialized at the PTO, and we see 
no sound reason why it would be.   
 
In short, it is apparent that, rather than voiding 
CollaGenex’s ownership of the mark by implication, the 
parties intended to and did confirm that CollaGenex owned 
the Restoraderm mark.  Galderma later succeeded to those 
vested rights.   
 
Despite the conspicuous absence of any language 
about trademark ownership in the 2004 Agreement, Sköld 
nevertheless argues that the 2002 transfer of the mark was 
undone by the 2004 Agreement.  He further contends that the 
2004 Agreement, sub silentio, both returned the mark to him 
and simultaneously retransferred the mark to CollaGenex 
under the “goodwill” provision of that agreement, but only 
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provisionally.12  For two reasons, we disagree that any such 
ownership ping-pong took place.  First, as already 
emphasized, the 2002 Agreement specifically provided that 
“any termination … shall not affect in any manner vested 
rights[.]” (App. at 1469.)  Thus, when that agreement 
terminated, CollaGenex continued to own Restoraderm, 
absent some clear documentation that ownership was 
changing hands again.  There is nothing of the sort.13   
 
Second, we reject Sköld’s interpretation of the phrase 
“hereof and thereof” in the 2004 Agreement’s integration 
clause to include all subject matter in either the 2004 
Agreement or the 2002 Agreement.14  Sköld, 2016 WL 
                                                 
12  The 2004 Agreement provided, in the event of 
termination by Sköld or CollaGenex, that CollaGenex would 
return certain assets, including related goodwill, to Sköld.  
 
13  Accordingly, at summary judgment, the District 
Court erred in concluding that the goodwill provision was 
subject to two reasonable interpretations – i.e. the term 
included Restoraderm or the term did not include 
Restoraderm – requiring further fact-finding.  Sköld, 2016 
WL 724755, at *5-6.  Because CollaGenex’s ownership of the 
mark survived termination of the 2002 Agreement, Sköld had 
no rights to Restoraderm when he executed the 2004 
Agreement.  Therefore he could not have transferred the mark 
under the “goodwill” provision or any other.   
 
 14  To repeat, that phrase appears in this context: “[The 
2004 Agreement] … cancels and supersedes any and all prior 
negotiations, correspondence, understandings and agreements 
(including the [2002 Agreement]) whether oral or written, 
Case: 17-3231     Document: 003113169655     Page: 16      Date Filed: 02/26/2019
17 
 
724755 at *2.  That phrase – “hereof and thereof” – includes 
only the subject matter shared between the two agreements.  
To interpret it otherwise, to include any subject matter in 
either agreement, would negate the difference between 
“hereof and thereof” and “hereof or thereof.”  The 
conjunctive phrase includes only shared subject matter and 
the disjunctive phrase includes any subject matter.  Indeed, as 
a general matter, integration clauses are meant to act as 
“conclusive evidence that the parties intended to supersede 
any prior contract on the same subject matter.”  ADR N. Am., 
L.L.C. v. Agway, Inc., 303 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added).  Since the 2002 Agreement encompassed 
trademarks, expressly including Restoraderm, and the 2004 
Agreement did not, the prior transfer of Restoraderm is not 
contained in “the subject matter hereof and thereof” in the 
2004 Agreement’s integration clause.  (App. at 1495.)  So, 
even if one thought that a property right like the one at issue 
here, documented at a government agency and announced to 
the world, could be divested by broad and non-specific 
language in an integration clause, the 2004 Agreement did not 
affect CollaGenex’s (and hence Galderma’s) ownership of 
Restoraderm.  See Kreiss v. McCown De Leeuw & Co., 37 F. 
Supp. 2d 294, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that provisions in 
a new agreement superseded provisions in an older agreement 
only to the extent that they covered the same subject matter 
even where the new agreement contained merger and 
                                                                                                             
 
between the Parties respecting the subject matter hereof and 
thereof; provided that nothing in this Agreement shall replace, 
supercede [sic], cancel or modify any prior agreements or 
assignments between the Parties that have been filed with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.”  (App. at 1495.)   
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integration clauses providing that the agreement “supersedes 
all prior arrangements or understandings … with respect 
thereto.” (alteration in original)). 
 
Accordingly, based on the unambiguous language of 
the 2002 Agreement, Galderma, as successor-in-interest to 
CollaGenex, became the rightful owner of the Restoraderm 
mark and remained so after the termination of that agreement.  
The 2004 Agreement did nothing to alter those rights.  We 
reach that conclusion as a matter of law, based on the 
unambiguous language of the contracts.   
 
Given that Sköld’s unjust enrichment claim was 
premised on Galderma’s use of the “Restoraderm trademark 
and related good will” being unlawful (App. at 1184), he was 
required to establish ownership of the mark to prevail.  
Because Galderma, not Sköld, is the rightful owner of the 
mark, its use of the mark is not unlawful or unjust, and 
Sköld’s unjust enrichment claim fails.  And, since Sköld’s 
claims for infringement, false advertising, and unfair 
competition were also premised on ownership of the mark, 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment in all respects, except for Sköld’s unjust 
enrichment claim, which we will reverse.  
Case: 17-3231     Document: 003113169655     Page: 18      Date Filed: 02/26/2019
